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IX—The Totality of Facts

Peter M. Sullivan
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00009.x 175-192 First published online: 1 June 2000

Abstract

Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, conceives the world as ‘the totality of facts’. Type-stratification threatens that conception: the totality of facts is an obvious example of an illegitimate totality. Wittgenstein's notion of truth-operation evidently has some role to play in avoiding that threat, allowing propositions, and so facts, to constitute a single type. The paper seeks to explain that role in a way that integrates the ‘philosophical’ and ‘technical’ pressures on the notion of an operation.

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