OUP user menu

VII—The Subjective View of Experience and Its Objective Commitments

Matthew Soteriou
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00110.x 177-190 First published online: 1 June 2005

Abstract

In the first part of the paper I try to explain why the disjunctive theory of perception can seem so counterintuitive by focusing on two of the standard arguments against the view—the argument from subjective indiscriminability and the causal argument. I suggest that by focusing on these arguments, and in particular the intuitions that lie behind them, we gain a clearer view of what the disjunctive theory is committed to and why. In light of this understanding, I then present an argument for the disjunctive theory based on the claim that the content of experience is particular and not general.

Sign in

Log in through your institution

Sign in as a personal subscriber

Log in through your institution

Purchase a personal subscription