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VII—The Bayesian and the Dogmatist

Brian Weatherson
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00217.x 169-185 First published online: 1 August 2007


It has been argued recently that dogmatism in epistemology is incompatible with Bayesianism. That is, it has been argued that dogmatism cannot be modelled using traditional techniques for Bayesian modelling. I argue that our response to this should not be to throw out dogmatism, but to develop better modelling techniques. I sketch a model for formal learning in which an agent can discover a posteriori fundamental epistemic connections. In this model, there is no formal objection to dogmatism.

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