OUP user menu

XIII—Epistemic Self-Respect

David Christensen
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x 319-337 First published online: 1 October 2007


Certain situations seem to call for acknowledging the possibility that one's own beliefs are biased or distorted. On the other hand, certain sorts of epistemic self-doubts (such as ‘I believe it's raining, but it's not’) seem paradoxical. And some have put forth epistemic principles requiring rational agents to regard their own credences as so-called ‘expert functions’. This paper examines the question of whether rationality requires agents to respect their own credences in a way in which they need not respect the credences of others.

Sign in

Log in through your institution

Sign in as a personal subscriber

Log in through your institution

Purchase a personal subscription