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Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components

Lee Walters
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00275.x 365-379 First published online: 1 October 2009

Abstract

Is AC sufficient for the truth of ‘If A were the case, C would be the case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not and produces a putative counterexample. But I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett's counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying Bennett's counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser's coin commits us to the sufficiency of AC for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual.

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