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V—Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence

Matthew Kennedy
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00280.x 77-109 First published online: 1 April 2010

Abstract

I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs.

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