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VIII—Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth

Stephen Barker
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00283.x 183-199 First published online: 1 September 2010


I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context of assertion V was bivalent. This theory requires a theory of assertion that is a form of cognitive expressivism.

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